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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4346 
 ___________ 
 
 WILLIAM KEISLING, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
JUDGE RICHARD K. RENN; JUDGE JOHN S. KENNEDY; JUDGE SHERYL ANN 
DORNEY; JUDGE MARIA MUSTI COOK; J. ROBERT CHUK; PAMELA S. LEE; 
RICK LEE; MEDIA NEWS GROUP; YORK DAILY RECORD; RUSSELL WANTZ; 
SCHAAD DETECTIVE AGENCY; L.C. “LARRY” HEIM; KATHERMAN HEIM & 
PERRY; COUNTY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA; YORK COUNTY JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT; NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE COMPANY; DOREEN 
WENTZ; PNC BANK; FREDDIE MAC; FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP.; UDREN LAW FIRM; MARK J. UDREN; LOUIS A. SIMONI; ALAN M. 
MINATO; JOHN DOE(S); RONALD CASTILLE; SUPREME COURT OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-02181) 
 District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 21, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 2, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant William Keisling appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
amended complaint.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s order.  See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Because this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Keisling filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous defendants,1 
alleging that he has worked for years at exposing the misconduct of officials in York 
County, and that as a result of this work, he has been subjected to unfair and retaliatory 
legal actions in which his rights have been repeatedly violated.  Keisling’s wide-ranging 
allegations focus primarily on three events:  (1) a custody case, in which the York County 
Court of Common Pleas denied Keisling’s application and granted custody of Keisling’s 
daughter to the child’s mother; (2) a foreclosure action on his home; and (3) a defamation 
                                                 
1
  Keisling has named the following defendants:  Richard Renn, the president judge 
of the York County Court of Common Pleas; John S. Kennedy, Sheryl Ann Dorney, and Maria 
Musti Cook, judges on the York County Court of Common Pleas; J. Robert Chuk, the court 
administrator for the York County Court of Common Pleas; Pamela S. Lee, the prothonotary of 
the York County Court of Common Pleas; the York Daily Record, a newspaper; Rick Lee, a 
reporter for the York Daily Record; MediaNews Group, the owner of the York Daily Record; the 
Schaad Detective Agency; Russell Wantz, the owner of the Schaad Detective Agency; L.C. 
“Larry” Heim, an attorney; Ronald Castille, the chief justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; 
Katherman, Heim and Perry, a law firm; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; the County of 
York; the York County Court of Common Pleas; National City Mortgage Company; Freddie 
Mac; Doreen Wentz, an agent for Freddie Mac; PNC Bank; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.; 
Mark J. Udren, an attorney; the Udren Law Firm; Louis A. Simoni, an attorney; and Alan M. 
Minato, an attorney.  
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lawsuit filed against him concerning statements he made in his book The Midnight Ride 
of Jonathan Luna.   
In two orders, the District Court adopted reports and recommendations from a 
magistrate judge and dismissed all of Keisling’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Keisling then filed a timely appeal.   
We agree with the District Court that Keisling has failed to state a viable claim.  
As an initial matter, we will affirm the Court’s conclusion that Judges Renn, Kennedy, 
Dorney, and Cook are protected by absolute immunity.  “A judicial officer in the 
performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his 
judicial acts.”  Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).  Here, Keisling has 
alleged that the judicial defendants violated his rights by entering a series of orders 
against him.  These are prototypical judicial acts, and the doctrine of judicial immunity 
therefore bars his claims.  See Gallas v. Supreme Court, 211 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 
2000).  Keisling’s allegations of corruption do not change this result.  See, e.g., Dennis v. 
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27- 28 (1980).   
We likewise agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Keisling’s complaint 
fails to state a claim against a number of defendants because it does not allege that they 
“act[ed] under color of state law,” as is required for a § 1983 action.  Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
includes the defendants who filed the defamation action against him (Wantz; the Schaad 
Detective Agency; Heim; and Kathermanm, Heim and Perry), and the defendants who 
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filed the foreclosure action against him (National City Mortgage, PNC Bank, Wentz, 
Udren, the Udren Law Firm, Simoni, and Minato).  See Dennis, 449 U.S. at 28 (“merely 
resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a 
co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge”).2 
The same analysis is fatal to Keisling’s claims against the Media News Group, the 
York Daily Record, and Rick Lee.  Keisling claims that Media News Group and the York 
Daily Record are government actors because they have entered into a joint operating 
agreement under the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04, but that is not 
correct — the Act merely waives the antitrust laws as to participating newspapers; it does 
not render the newspapers an arm of the federal government.  See § 1801 (observing that 
it is “[i]n the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially 
independent”).  While Keisling makes bald, conclusory allegations that all of the private 
                                                 
2  During the foreclosure action, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 
(“Freddie Mac”) was also a private actor (and thus not amenable to suit under § 1983).  
See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 
1407-09 (9th Cir. 1996).  It is true that in September 2008, Freddie Mac was placed under 
federal conservatorship.  See, e.g., Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, Mortgage 
Giants Taken Over by U.S., N.Y Times, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.  Even assuming that at this 
time Freddie Mac began acting under color of federal law, and construing Keisling’s 
claim as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the claim fails because Freddie Mac (under this 
assumption) is a government entity and not an individual government agent.  See FDIC v. 
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1994).  Even more fundamentally, Keisling’s allegations 
concerning the ejectment action (as to both Freddie Mac and the individuals who 
purportedly acted in concert with it) are entirely conclusory and fail to state a facially 
plausible claim.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Threadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 
not suffice.”). 
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defendants were involved in a conspiracy with the judicial defendants, these allegations 
are insufficient to plead an unconstitutional conspiracy (or, concomitantly, to plead that 
the defendants therefore acted under color of state law).  See Great W. Mining & Mineral 
Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 176-78 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Nor did the District Court err in concluding that the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania and the York County Court of Common Pleas are entitled to immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment.  See, e.g., Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 
233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  While states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
see Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2002), 
Pennsylvania has not done so, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).  Moreover, although 
Congress can abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the 
enactment of § 1983, the federal law under which Keisling proceeds.  See Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).    
Keisling’s claim against York County likewise fails.  A municipality can be liable 
under § 1983 only when its policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, see City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989), and Keisling has failed to allege any such 
policy or custom.   
We will also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Keisling’s claims against 
Pamela Lee and J. Robert Chuk.  Keisling complains that Lee failed to notify him that a 
certain motion had been assigned to Judge Cook and that she issued a writ of possession, 
and that Chuk wrongly assigned a case to Judge Dorney.  However, putting aside 
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Keisling’s conclusory labels, he has failed to show that he possesses a plausible claim 
that these defendants acted inappropriately or otherwise violated his constitutional rights.  
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to 
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it 
has not shown — that the pleader is entitled to relief.” (internal quotation marks, 
alteration omitted)). 
Finally, we agree with the District Court that Keisling has failed to state a claim 
against Chief Justice Castille.  While Keisling was apparently offended by a speech that 
Chief Justice Castille made concerning the League of Women Voters, he has not shown 
that the speech violated his constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992) (providing that one of the elements of 
constitutional standing to bring suit is a concrete injury personal to the plaintiff). 
Accordingly, we conclude that there is no substantial question presented by this 
appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court’s orders dismissing Keisling’s 
complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  
